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Abstract 
We study the choice of a maximizing Bureaucrat over privatization policies and their effects on 
consumer welfare in a transition economy. We study a Bureaucrat whose objective function is 
maximizing a surplus budget subject to the constraint of staying in office, and a Bureaucrat 
who maximizes popularity/consumer welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget. 
Other things being equal, both types of Bureaucrat will privatize the sector (firms) with the 
least market power and the most subsidy first. This is the "cheapest" way to privatize state­
owned enterprises. Also, it is shown that it is relatively easier and faster to privatize in a less 
democratic society. 
THE OPTIMAL CHOICE OF PRIVATIZING 
S TATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A POLI TIC AL 
ECONOMIC MODEL 
Yan Chen* 
1 Introduction
Because of the universally recognized deficiencies of state-owned enterprises compared to private 
enterprises, there is almost no controversy over the necessity to transform central-planned 
economies into market economies. The controversy lies in how to perform the transition. In 
this paper, we study the impact of privatization policies on consumer welfare, the consumers' 
preferences over different privatization bundles, and hence, what policies will be chosen by 
politicians with different objectives and under different political institutions. In particular, we 
study which kind of enterprises they would choose to privatize first. 
In the past few years, socialist countries have tried different routes of transition from central­
planned to market economies. There have been two types of transition policies: a "big-bang" 
policy of rapid and thorough privatization through a comprehensive plan, as practiced in most 
of the Eastern European countries and Russia; and an evolutionary policy, chiefly employed 
in China, where economic reform has been introduced step-by-step over the past decade1 . 
Both types of policies have had rocky transitions. The transition period is usually marked by 
substantial price increases, imperfect competition and a :fluctuation in people's living standards. 
Most of the time, these characteristics are the result of certain features of the old planned 
economy. Studying the mixed effects of the old and new economic and political institutions 
during this special period reveals the influence of different policies, especially the sequencing 
of policies, which can have a substantial impact on the reform process as well as on people's 
living standards. 
Debates over privatization policies among economists of socialist countries usually focus on 
the sequencing problem, i.e., how to find the optimal sequence of privatization so as to mini­
mize the problems eharactEn,izing.•the tr&nsitionc,period,--'FJv;-quencedsuggested and practiced 
in these countries roughly follows the size of different sectors2: rapid privatization of small 
*I would like to thank John Ledyard, l{im Border, Morgan l{ousser, Peter Ordeshook and Torn Palfrey for all 
their help and suggestions. I also benefited from discussions with Kay-yut Chen1 Peng Lian, Katerina Sherstyuk 
and Langche Zeng. Financial assistance from the Flight Projects Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 
of NASA to the Program on Organization Design (PrOD) is greatly appreciated. All remaining errors are my 
own. 
1See John McMillan and Barry Naughton (1992) for a detailed comparison.
2See Yining Li (1989); Hans Blommesteine and Michael Marrese [ed.] (1991), p.15 and p.23 
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businesses first; establishment of a social safety net; demonopolization; privatization of medium 
state-owned enterprises; and last, privatization of large state-owned enterprises. 
Despite the heated discussions and various experiments over sequencing, there is virtually 
no theoretical work on sequencing. Most of the privatization literature concentrates on the sale 
mechanisms3, ownership and incentives4, the regulation of privatized firms5, and the problems 
of the transition period6. In particular, there is no formal model in the privatization literature 
that incorporates the influence of politics on privatization policies. We need to remember that 
politicians are the ones that choose the privatization policies. Therefore, it is important to see 
what kind of policies a maximizing politician would choose under different political institutions. 
In this paper, we set up a model to test the rationale of the sequences suggested above 
by economists of central planned economies and to study what kind of sequence a Bureaucrat 
with different objectives would choose. Section 2 introduces the setup and basic assumptions 
of a highly simplified transition economy and a Bureaucrat, a simplified representation of the 
political institution. In Section 3, we analyse the problem of the consumer, the firm and the 
Bureaucrat respectively. We consider two types of Bureaucrats: one who maximizes the surplus 
budget subject to the constraint of staying in office and one who maximizes popularity/ consumer 
welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget7. In Section 4, we present the main results 
of the model: other things being equal, both types of Bureaucrat will first privatize the sector( s) 
which have the least market power8 and which receive the largest subsidy. Also, we show that 
it can be relatively easier and faster to privatize in a less democratic society. F inally, in Section 
5, we discuss the limitations and possible extensions of the model and conclude the paper. 
2 Setup and Basic Assumptions
In this section we present a simple two period model of a transition economy that consists of I 
consumers, N sectors of firms, and a Bureaucrat.
Consumers have different utility functions and incomes, which are exogenously given. At 
time t, consumer i is rationed to a fixed amount of products from the public sectors at fixed 
prices. Because of the low prices and minimum amounts supplied, we assume that he buys all the 
quantities that are rationed to him. This assumption closely approximates the actual situations 
in many central planned economies. He uses the rest of his income to choose consumption 
bundles from the products of the private sectors to maximize his utility. 
Assumption 1 Each consumer has a quasilinear utility function, 11;(q1, .. ., qN ) + m;, where
q1, • . •  qN are the amounts of products 1, . .  ., N he consumes, and m is a numeraire good. 
1l : R1f_+I -+ R� is monotonically increasing, twice continuously differentiable, strictly quasi-
3See Patrick Bolton and Gerard Roland (1992) Appendix 2; and Fernando Branco and Antonio S. Mello 
(1991). 
4See Jean Tirole (1991) 
5See Jean Tirole (1991)
6See David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs (1990) for a model of repressed inflation and the corresponding strategies 
of transition. Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) has an interesting model of supply diversion. 
7We will see later that this is equivalent to maximizing budget. 
8This concept is introduced later. It basically captures the competitiveness of the sector and the elasticity of 
the product. The higher the market power of a sector, the more it can raise the price above marginal cost. 
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concave, and satisfies the following Inada conditions: 
limq)Ofj
fj 
ui (qi , ... , qN ) = +oo, limq)oofj
fj 
ui(q1 , ... , qN ) = O.
'
qj J qj 
In the model, firms produce N distinct products and are hence divided into N sectors. Each
sector j consists of Lj identical firms, where L; E [1, +oo ) .  When L; = 1 ,  sector j is a monopoly;
when Lj is large enough (approaching infinity), sector j is competitive; when Lj is between 1 
and infinity, it can have different degrees of competitiveness9. At time t - 1, k sectors are public 
(denoted by sector 1 ,  . . .  k) ,  and n - k sectors are private (denoted by sectors k + 1, k + 2, . . .  ,
NJ. In each period the Bureaucrat can choose to privatize one or more sectors. At time t, the 
Bureaucrat decides whether to continue privatizing, and which sector(s) to privatize. Without 
loss of generality, assume sector k is picked. We can then study the characteristics of k and the 
influence of its privatization on the changes in consumer welfare. 
Assume that a firm lj in public sector j fulfills quota Qij imposed by the Bureaucrat, and
sells its output at a fixed price Fj, which is below the market-clearing price. This assumption 
reflects a basic feature of the central planned economies, where prices are fixed for historical 
reasons and reflect neither cost nor market demand. Therefore, the total output of sector j is 
Qj = Q1; * L;. For simplicity, assume the population in the economy is fixed. Therefore, we 
can assume that Q; and Q1j are fixed as long as sector j remains public, since the quota is 
decided by rationing over the total population. Let the revenue of (or subsidy to) sector j be 
Bj = Fj * Qj - Ctj(Q;) * L;, where C1j(·) is the cost function of firm lj. 
After sector j is privatized, firm lj's objective becomes profit maximization. It chooses the 
optimal output Q1; and sells it at the market-clearing price Pj. Let 7r/j be the firm's profit 
function, and Ctj its cost function which satisfies the following assumptions: 
Assumption 2 C: R� -+ R� is differentiable and monotonic.
Let P;(Q1, .. .,QN) be sector j's inverse demand function. To ensure the existence of a 
Cournot equilibrium10, we need some assumptions on Pj( Q). 
Assumption 3 Pj( Q) is twice continuously differentiable, monotonic, and sastisfies 3�S�) +
Qj 82:QbQ) ::; 0, which requires the inverse demand function to be concave.
J 
Note that the cost function of firm lj does not change before or after privatization. Here 
we implicitly assume that technology does not change. What is changed is the production 
quantity and price, which is adjusted for the purpose of profit maximization. This implies that 
the objective functions of the firms change after privatization, but any efficiency gain occurs 
after the transition period. 
In order to simplify the structure in the later part of the model, we assume that none of 
the products of the- N·s<lctorn are-s11bstih1tes ·for·each"ether:--·Tliey ·can-· be ·either -independent 
or complements. Another way to think about this assumption is to group all the substitutes in 
the economy in the same sector and simplify them into one product by using marginal rates of 
substitution. 
Assumption 4 The cross elasticity of any two products Eij 
1 ,  2, . . .  ,n. 
9See Jean Tirole (1988), p.218 - p.221, p.226 - p.228. 
&q fl_ 0 w · -1- - - • =-ap'. - � ,virJ,i,J= J q, 
10See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee and R.obert D. V\Tillig [ed.] (1988), p.334 - p.335.
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This assumption is equivalent to f/f: :::; 0, Vi cJ j ,  which implies that the consumers' utility
J 
functions need to satisfy the following condition: a;,��£ :::; 0, Vl = 1, . .. , N. (See Appendix for 
proof.) 
The Bureaucrat is a simplified representation of the government. He is assumed to maximize 
the surplus budget11. For comparison we also consider what happens if he maximizes consumer 
welfare, which reflects the Bureaucrat's popularity and job security. He knows the distribution 
of consumers' utility functions12 and the distributions of shares in the private sectors. At 
any given time t, he makes three decisions - whether to continue privatizing, which sector to 
privatize and how to compensate the consumers. In order to concentrate on the characteristics 
of the transition period, we neglect some other important functions of the government, such as 
public good provision, and assume that the Bureaucrat's only functions are privatization and 
compensation. We use a parameter d to characterize the political institutions, where dis the 
percentage of consumers he needs to satisfy in order to stay in office. 
3 Analysis of the Model
3.1 The Firm's Problem 
Public firm lj in sector j is given the quota Qlj. Suppose it can fulfill the quota and sell its
output at the fixed price P;. Then it will provide revenue (or demand subsidy) of the amount
Bz;, where Bz; = P1Q lj - C( Q11 ). So the total revenue (or subsidy) of sector j is
B - PQ- - C(Q-· )1 1 1  1 ·
After the firm is privatized, it becomes a profit maximizer. It chooses its optimal output 
Q11 to maximize its profit. The price of product j is determined by the total output of the
sector, which depends on the decisions of the other identical firms in the same sector and the 
total output of other sectors. Note that by Assumption 1, consumers all have quasilinear utility
functions, so the inverse demand functions exist. We use Cournot equilibrium analysis for the 
private firms' decisions. 
Firm lj chooses the optimal output Q1; in order to
From Assumption 2, we know that the second order condition for the above maximization 
problem is satisfied, so we only need to look at the first order condition, which is, 
Here we use M Cj to denote the marginal cost of firms in sector j. Rearranging terms we get
11To be defined later. 
12But he does not know the exact utility function of each consumer. 
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where €jj is the own elasticity of demand at Q;, and €jh is the cross elasticity of demand
between product j and product h. Since all firms of the same sector are identical, namely, they 
all have the same cost functions, the market share of firm lj equals the inverse of the number 
of firms in sector j, i.e., �Q' = ]. . Note that the above formula is very similar to the CournotJ 1 
oligopoly pricing formula, where a;= P;(Q)-MC, = �Q' ..l.13 We call a; firm lj's market powerP;(Q) J '11 index, which also characterizes sector j's market power. Alternatively, we can write the above 
equation as P; = ��j, which will be used later.
Note that the market power index is quite general with regard to the degree of competi­
tiveness in a sector. When L; = 1, the above formula becomes the monopoly pricing formula.
On the other hand, if Lj -+ oo, the equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium14.
Therefore, the market power index shows how much a sector can raise the price of its product 
above its marginal cost. It is inversely related to the number of firms in the sector and the 
elasticities of demand of the product. 
3.2 The Consumer's Problem 
We assumed above that in a socialist economy consumer i buys all the rationed products first, 
and then uses the rest of his income to choose a consumption bundle from the private sector. 
In order to study the effects of the privatization of a certain sector, say k, on the change of his 
utility, we study his maximization problem in two arbitrarily chosen contiguous time periods, 
t-1 and t. 
At time t-1, sectors 1, . . .  , k are in the public sector, fulfilling quotas; sectors k+l, . . .  , N 
are in the private sector, maximizing profits. Consumer i's rationed quantities of products 1
through k are <[1, ... , r[k, which are allocated equally to everybody in the economy. In reality, the
allocations vary from person to person according to age, sex and other personal characteristics. 
Here, for simplicity of analysis, and also because we can not distinguish among individual 
consumers, we assume an equal allocation. He then chooses a consumption bundle of products 
from the private sector and the amount of numeraire good to maximize his utility subject to 
his budget constraint: 
N N k 
"""' pt-I t-1 + t-1 + """' IJ (l ) t-1 """'p- - _ t-1 s .t. L j qij mi =Yi L ij - Tj 7rj - L jqj =Yi · 
j=k+l j=k+l j=l 
Here Tj is the tax rate of sector j, and IJ;j is consumer i's proportion of shares in sector
j. From the budget constraint, we see that consumer i's income comes from two sources: his
exogenously given income y.;, which can be interpreted as wage and other personal endowments,
and his share of the after tax profit from the private sector, I:f=k+i IJ;j(l- r; )xj-1. His effective
income, y;-1, with which he can choose his consumption bundle among products produced in
the private sector, is total income less the expenditure on rationed products. 
13See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig [ed.] (1989), Ch.6. We rewrite it using the notations
of this paper.
14See Jean Tirole (1988), p.226 - p.228. 
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J 
Solving this maximization problem, we can get the demand function of consumer i for good 
t-I t-1*(pt-I pt-I)qij = qij k+l' ... , N 
and the aggregate demand function for product j 
I 
Q;-1 = Lq)j1*(Pk:;:i, ... ,Pfl.c-1).
i=l 
Plugging the demand function into consumer i's utility function gives us his indirect utility 
function 
(p- p- pt-1 pt-1 t-1) ,1. (P- p- pt-1 pt-1) + t-1 Vi 1, ... , k, k+l''"'' N ,yi = 'Yi J, ... , k, k+I, . .. ,. N Yi '
h ,1. (P-t-1) ( - - t-'*(p-t-1) t-'*(p-t-1)) "°'N pt-I t-'*(p-t-1) s· w ere 'Yi = Ui q1, ... , qk, qik+I , ... , qiN - L. .. j=k+I 1 qij . ince
consumer i has quasi-linear utility function, his indirect utility function can be written in two 
parts, with effective income separate from ¢(ft-l ).
At time t, if another sector, say, sector k, is privatized, consumer i is given compensation T 
for the price increase in product k and the price changes in the other private sectors15. At the 
same time, he can buy shares in the newly privatized sector and reap his corresponding profit 
in this sector. We set up his optimization problem in a similar way to that at time t-1, but 
there are some differences. Now that product k is no longer rationed, he has one more choice 
variable; also, because of the shares he buys in the newly privatized sector and the change in 
the profits in the old private sector, his effective income is changed. Now he chooses q{k, ... ,t t . d qiN' mi in or er to
N N k-1 
s.t. L PJq/j +ml = Yi+ L O;j(l - Tj )1CJ - e,ksk - L P;i[j + T = y/,j=k j=k j=l 
where Sk is the total revenue from the sale of sector k. Solving this maximization problem,
we can get the demand function of consumer i for good j 
t t*(P' pt ) qij :::::: qij k1 ... , N '
and the aggregate demand function for product j 
I 
Q] = Lq{j(Pk,···,Pfv).
i=l 
Plugging the demand function into consumer i's utility function gives us his indirect utility 
function 
15Compensation is a frequently used scheme during the transition period in socialist countries. 
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We would like to know the minimal amount of compensation for consumer i necessary to 
keep him on the same indifference curve, after we privatize sector k, as he was before. This can 
be done by equating his indirect utility function at time t to that at t-1, i.e., 
which enables us to solve the individual consumer's minimal compensation, 
N 
Tt = tPi(ft1-1)- tPi(P1) + L llij(l - 7j)(7rj-l - 7rJ) + Oik[Sk - ( 1- 7k)7rk]- pkrfk·j=k+I 
The first two terms are the change of his indirect utility due to price changes, which we label 
the price effect; the next two terms show the consumer's income changes due to the changes in 
his after tax profit shares, which we label the profit effect. This is an important expression in 
the later analysis of the Bureaucrat's problem. 
F igure 1 shows the consumer's consumption before and after privatization in a simple two­
good economy. At time t-1, sector 2 is private, while sector 1 is public. Since !ft is the rationed
amount, the consumer's consumption bundle (lf1, q2) usually is not the tangency point. At
time t, sector 1 is privatized. The price of product 1 goes up to the market clearing price P1,
and the price of product 2 also changes. With the new price ratio and effective income, the 
consumer maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint. For some consumers, the new 
consumption bundle can lie on a higher indifference curve; for others, it can lie on a lower 
indifference curve. The minimal compensation, T*, shows the amount of transfer needed to get 
the consumer to the tangent point consumption bundle, (q1,q2), on the previous indifference
curve. Note that it could be positive, zero or negative. 
3.3 The Bureaucrat's Problem 
The Bureaucrat is a highly simplified representation of the government. At any given time t, 
he decides whether to continue privatizing, and, if yes, what sector(s) to privatize and how to 
compensate the consumers. Assume at time t, his budget comes from three sources: 
(1) Revenue and subsidies from the public sectors, r;j;:f Bj; 
(2) Revenue from the sale of the public sector k, Sk; 
(3) Taxes from the private sectors, r;f=k r;7rj. 
It would be interesting to understand the details of the sale process. But since it depends 
on the bargaining power of the seller and the buyers, the future profitability of the firms and 
a number of other political considerations, we do not study these in this paper. We assume 
that the sale mechanism is efficient enough such that the sale revenue approximates the after 
tax profit, i.e., Sk = (1 +<k)(l- 7k)7rf,, .wlrn"'' Ek E{�t,.l).,:epresents the percentage difference
between the sale amount and the actual after tax profit due to the bargaining power of the 
buyers and seller, political considerations or other factors. 
We give the Bureaucrat the objective function of maximizing the surplus budget, i.e., total 
budget less total consumer compensation, subject to the constraint of staying in office. The 
surplus can be used to build up the Bureaucracy, or on personal gratification, if he is a corrupt 
bureaucrat. This objective function can be justified under a range of circumstances16. In a 
16See William A. Niskanen (1971), Chapter 3 and 4. 
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Figure 1: Consumption Before And After Privatization of Sector 1 
society with elections, suppose that consumers/voters use a retrospective voting rule, i.e. , they 
will vote for the Bureaucrat if they occupy the same or a higher utility curve in this period 
as in the last period, and vote against him if they are on a lower utility curve. We denote 
the proportion of votes he has to get to stay in office as d. In a society without elections, 
the Bureaucrat also needs to satisfy a certain percentage of consumers to be able to stay in 
office, though this d could be much lower than the one in a democratic society. For example, 
suppose that consumers in a society without elections judge the Bureaucrat's policy in a similar 
retrospective way as those in a democratic society, and they can throw the Bureaucrat out of 
the office by revolt or other means, if the percentage of dissatisfied consumers exceeds 1 - d.
Therefore, the Bureaucrat's constraint is to satisfy at least d percent of the consumers to stay 
in office. 
We assume that the Bureaucrat knows the distribution of the consumers' utility functions, 
but does not know the utility functions of individual consumers. In each period, therefore, he 
compensates everybody the same amount17• Depending on their utility functions, some con­
sumers will be better off and some will be worse off after the privatization and the compensation 
than they were before. 
To formalize the problem, we let the Bureaucrat choose the sector and the level of consumer 
compensation to 
k N 
maxI:Bj+ L Tjirj+[-Bk+sk+rkirkJ-IT 
j=l j=k+l 
s.t.�li: T 2: Ti l 2: d,
where the constraint means that at least d of the voters are content with the level of compen­
sation offered by the government. 
For comparison with the behavior of the Bureaucrat who maximizes surplus budget, we 
model another kind of Bureaucrat whose objective function is to maximize popularity or con­
sumer welfare, subject to a balanced budget, i.e., 
maxli: T 2: Til 
k N 
s.t. L Bj + L Tjir] +[-Bk+ sk + Tkirk] =IT.
j=l j=k+I 
In the next section, we will analyse the decisions of both types of Bureaucrat and compare their 
optimal behavior. 
4 Main Results and�Disoussions 
4.1 Individual Consumer's Minimal Compensation
In order to study the Bureaucrat's decision, we need to know how an individual consumer's 
minimal compensation changes with the characteristics of sector k, °'k, and how the number of
17This is a feasible and practicai compensation scheme. It is used in China after each successive "price 
liberationi' reform and in Russia. 
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shares consumer i purchases in sector k affects the magnitude of his minimal compensation. To 
do this, we need a lemma that shows how cPi(P') changes with the change in Pt.a¢ (P') Lemma 1 BP' :::; 0. 
k 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
We know that cPi(P') = u;(c[1, ... ,qk--i,q/i;(P'), ... ,q!N(P'))- L,f=kPJq/J(P').
Differentiating c/>;(P') with respect to Pt, we get
8¢i(P') 
_ 
N 8ui(qf*(P')) 8qj*(P') N ,8qj*(P') * -, [)pt - L {}q'* {JP' - L 
pj {JP' -qk(P ).k J=k J k J=k k 
Since consumer i has quasilinear utility function, we have Bu;(�·:�P')) = PJ. Therefore,
q, 
Q.E.D. 
8¢i(P') = _ *(P-') < 0 [)pt qk - .k 
So ¢;( P') decreases with the increase of Pk, the price of product k. 
Proposition 1 When a sector k is privatized, and consumer i's share in sector k is Oik :::; A;, 
then other things being constant, the minimal individual compensation increases with an increase 
in Pt, and with an increase in the market power of sector k. I.e.,
{)T.* {)T� 
{ 
:'.". 0 ' ' 
8Pf 8ak < O 
f 5 O dn < A S>o z Ek apt< an uik _ i: or Ek apt _ ; k k 
if Ek� < 0 and eik > Ai; k 
We know that the minimal compensation for consumer i is 
and that the sale amount of sector k is Sk = (1 + ek)(l - Tk)irk, where Ek E (-1, 1). Plugging
this into Ti, we get
N 
Ti= ¢;(P'-1) -¢;(P') + L eij(l - rj)( irj-1 - irj) + eik<k(1 - rk)irk - �hcfk·j=k+l 
Differentiating Ti with respect to Pk, we get
10 
From Lemma 1, we know that 0¢3f,'l ::; 0 .  So the first term is positive.
k 
Next, we want to sign the second term. The profit function of private firm lj can be written 
as 
rr1; = P;Q1;(P) - C;(Q1;(P)). 
Differentiating the above expression with respect to Pk, we have 
0Q1;(P) 
oP' [P; - MC;(Q1;)] 
::; 0,
k 
81rt-
since we assume that the products are not substitutes. Therefore, aJ1r ::; 0. So the second term
k 
is also positive. 
Since the profit in sector k can increase or decrease with an increase in the price of product 
k, the sign of � is ambiguous.
k 
5 &T.* (1 ) If fk &P' 2'. 0, then we have BP 2'. 0.k k 
(2) If fk �;� < 0, however, the exact change in the amount of compensation caused by the
k 
change in the price of product k depends on the proportion of shares he holds in sector k. 
When 0 ::; 8;k ::; A;, we have # 2'. 0. On the other hand, if 8;k > A;, we have ��: < 0.
k k 
S. P MC; •t £ ]] h � 0 W k h t BT' BT'� Tl ' h . Ince j = 1_,.,,., I o ows t at "" > . e now t a � = �pt "" . iere1ore, t e sign
V-J VO:k VO:k V ,__ VO'.k 
f BT' . th ) . f BT' Q E D 
,. 
o &e:;, 1s e same as t ie sign o ""EiPf. . . . 
Proposition 1 tells us that when consumer i's share in the newly privatized sector is below a 
certain level, his minimal compensation goes up when the price of product k increases; when his 
share is above a certain level, his minimal compensation actually decreases with an increase in 
the price of product k. Intuitively, as a small shareholder or somebody who does not hold any 
shares in the newly privatized sector, the price effect dominates the profit effect - he mainly 
suffers from the price increase as a consumer; if he is a large shareholder, however, he shares in 
the profits of privatization, and the profit effect dominates the price effect. 
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1 with a simple computer simulation. The economy consists
of 100 consumers and two goods. Consumer i's utility function takes the form of u; = a;,;qi + 
(1 - a;),j<fi, + m;, where the indices a; E [O, 1] are generated randomly by the computer. At
time t-1, both sectors are public. We normalize F1 = F2 = q2 = 1. At time t, sector 2, is
privatized, but sector 1 is still public. Let the tax rate be 0.3, and £2 be 0. Let sector 2 have 
a cubic cost function, C2 = .04q? - .9q5 + lOq + 5. For a randomly picked consumer i, we give
him different proportion of shares in sector k, and plot out how his minimal compensation, T;*, 
changes with the change in.Pk, when .. his .. proportion.d.shares, 8 = .. 0,.0.1,0.3,0.5. We can see 
that when 8 = 0, 0.1 ,  his minimal compensation increases with an increase in Pk; when 8 = 0.3,
the cutpoint, the graph goes to the other direction from pk = 2; when e = 0.5, this large
shareholder's minimal compensation decreases with an increase in Pk. Note that this is only a 
100-consumer economy. In a large economy, the cutpoint should be much smaller. 
Apart from the above, we would like to know the change in the minimal compensation for 
con8un1er i as the proportion of shares he holds changes. The result is summed up in Proposition 
2 as follows: 
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Proposition 2 i�: = Ek (l - Tk )1rk { � � 
< 0
Proof of Proposition 2: 
if Ek > 0 
if Ek = 0
if Ek < 0 
Differentiating Tt with respect to 8;k, we can get Proposition 2 directly. Q.E.D.
This proposition tells us that when the sale is underpriced, Ek < 0, we need to compensate 
the shareholders less, the more shares they have. If the sale price is exactly the same as the
after tax profit, Ek = 0, the change in the proportion of shares of a consumer does not affect the 
minimal compensation for him. When the sale is overpriced, however, we need to compensate 
the shareholders more, the more shares they have18. 
4.2 Minimal Aggregate Compensation 
In order to solve the Bureaucrat's problem, we need to know the distribution of an individual 
consumer's minimal compensation, since the Bureaucrat does not know each individual's utility 
functions and shares. He can only make his decision based on the aggregate behavior of the 
individual's minimal compensation. Recall the form of the minimal individual compensation, 
Tt, 
N 
Tt = </>;(P'-1) -</>i(P') + :L 8ij(l - Tj)(1rJ-1 - 7rj) + lf;kEk (l - Tk)1rk - Fkrfk· j=k +l 
Note that there are two kinds of distributions in the above expression, the indirect utility 
function </>(-) and the consumer's proportion of shares in a private sector, IJ.j· So in order to 
know the distribution of Ti, we need to know the distributions of </>i( ftt-l) -</>i( P') and IJ.j.
Different individua.ls usually have different utility functions. Let F be all possible functional
forms of</>(-), and let <!> be the admissible set of F, i.e., <!> C F : RY -> R. We can label the
indirect utility functions in <!> by w .  Let the index set fl be a subset of the real line, i.e., 
w E fl C R. We assume that </>(-, w )  depends continuously on index w, and that 0¢J�w) > 0. w 
has cumulative distribution function M(w ). 
Let 8-j � Fj, j = k,k + 1, ... ,N. Let the joint distribution of 1Jk, ... ,8N be F(8in-k+l,
where IJ E 0, and 0 is the admissible set of 8.j. We employ the following notation: jJ =
(bk , bk+1,  ... , bN ), where the b/s are the coefficients of the 8.j's; c = Fkrfk , which is a constant
because it is the expenditure on the rationed allotment of product k. For simplicity of calcula­
tion, we assume that w and 8i are independent of ea.ch other. Suppose Ti � G(-, /J), then we
get the following lemma for the distribution of Tt: 
Lemma 2 For a.ny given level of compensation T, the cumulative distribution function of
T;*, i.e. , the percentage of consumers for .which T;* S: T, is
G(T,/Jl= f ··· f [r dM(w )] dF (er-k+1•Je J{wEil,¢(P'-1,w)-¢(P' ,w)+/3B-cST}
Proof of Lemma. 2: 
i8Perhaps we do not need to worry about this situation because nobody will buy any shares of sector kif the 
expected after tax profit share is less than the amount of money they pay for the shares. 
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Let ¢(f51-1, w)-¢(P1, w) = z, and let z follow the distribution H(·, P'-1, P'). Then
H(.,J5'-1,P1) = Prob(z$a)= f • dM(w). }{ wEf!,¢(P'-1,w)-¢(P' ,w)Sa} 
This equation gives us the cumulative distribution function of z, expressed in terms of w. Using 
simplifying notations, we can rewrite the minimal individual compensation as Ti = z +/]if - c. 
Suppose T;* � G(., /J) ,  then for any given level of compensation T, we have the cumulative 
distribution function 
G(T, /J) = 
= 
Q.E.D. 
J . .. f [ r .. dH(b)] dF(or-k+I
j e j { z,,+µB-cST} 
J ... le H(T + c - /Jif)dF(or-k+I
! ... f [r dM(w)] dF(or-k+1. Je J{wEf!,¢(P'-1,w)-¢(P',w)+iiii-cST} · 
Therefore, we can express the cumulative distribution of T;* in terms of the distribution of 
w and if. And this facilitates our method of solving the Bureaucrat's problem.
Consider the surplus budget maximizing Bureaucrat's problem: 
k N 
max L Bj + L Tj1CJ +[-Bk+ sk + Tkirk] -IT 
j=l j=k+l 
s.t.�li: T?: T;*I ?: d.
The constraint is equivalent to G(T, /J) ?: d. We can convert his constrained maximization 
problem into one of unconstrained maximization by finding the minimal T, T min, to keep him 
in office. Therefore, he chooses the public sector k to 
k N 
m ax L;Bj+ I; TjirJ+[-Bk+Sk+rkirk]-ITmin, 
j=l j=k+I 
where Tmin is the solution to G(Tmin, /J) = d. We call Tmin the minimal aggregate compensation 
in a transition economy. 
Figure 3 illustrates the concept of the minimal aggregate compensation by using the same 
economy as in Figure 2. We calculate the minimal individual compensation for all 100 con­
sumers and plot out the cumulative distribution function. Then for any given level of d, the 
proportion of consumers to be left not worse off by the privatization of sector k and the amount 
of compensation, we can find a corresponding T min, the minimal amount of compensation paid 
to every consumer in the economy so that at least d percent of the consumers are better off. 
We need to find out the properties of T min - how it changes with the changes in the 
underlying parameters. 
Proposition 3 Jn a large population, the minimal aggregate compensation, T min, increases
with an increase in the market power of sector k, °'k. i.e., 
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Proof of Proposition 3: We know that
which holds in a large population; 
G(Tmin, /J) = j · · · f [ f 
• 
• •• 
dM(w)] dF(er-k+l = d.
Je } { wEfl,¢(P<-> ,w)-¢(P' ,w)+f3B-c"T min} 
Let T = -"(P-'-1 , w ) - -"(P-', w) + (3-B - c. First, we want to show that ar > 0 Vw B if'I' 'I' iJPk - , ' ,
Prob{IJk :; A} = 1.
Differentiating T with respect to Pl, we get 
From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that the first two terms are both positive, while the 
sign of the third term is ambiguous. 
( ) � BT 1 If Ek BP' ;::: 0, then we have BP' ;::: 0.k k 
- a ' 8¢(P'.w) "C'N " ( ·)_"_;_ a t ----apr-+ L-j=k+1 uJ I-r1 apt 
(2) If ckiJft < 0, we need more conditions to decide the sign of zJ, . Let A = · an' • k k Ek(l-rk)� a Pk 
Note that there are two kinds of distributions in A: the index of utility functions, w, and the 
proportion of shares in the existing private sectors, Oj, j = k + 1, .. ., N.  Since </>(pt, w) is de­
creasing in P, and strictly increasing in w, we use >o'. to denote the highest absolute value of 
a,p��;w) , and w to denote its lowest absolute value. And we know that the proportion of sharesk 
in each private sector, 8,; E [O, l]. Then it follows that the lower bound of A is 
a,p(P',w) 
A = ___ a_P�k __ a ' . Ek(l - Tk) 0;� k 
Therefore, if Prob{ Ok :; A}= 1, we have zJ, ;::: 0, Vw, I/k 
Next, we want to show that Tmin has a similar property. It follows from the first part of the 
proof t,hat for any P�';::: P;, if P�ob{IJk :0: A}= 1, we have T' ;::: T, Vw, B. We want to showthat T min � T min, w 11ere T min satisfies
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' 
{ 
' Suppose not, then Tmin < Tmin· Let A = w E Q : T S Tmin}, and B =
Tmin}. Since T' ;::: T, it follows that A<;; B. We know that
It follows that 
J ... le [ii dM(w)] dF(11r-k+i = d.
j ... le [L dM(wl] dF(11r-k+1 s d.
Let C = {w E Q: T' s T�;n}· Since Tmin > T�in' we have Cc A. Therefore,
j ... le [fc dM(wl] dF(11r-k+l < d,
{w E Q : T S 
but this contradicts the definition of T�in· So T�in ;::: Tmin· Then we have 0�J5!" ;::: 0, and
equivalently, 0I'!:;" ;::: 0.
Finally, we want to show that Prob{llk :<;A}= 1 holds in a large population. 
{ } { } Ii: ll;k > Al Prob Ilk s A = l - Prob Ilk > A = 1 - I - , 
Since L;f=l ll;k = 1, Ii : IJ;k > Al < min int[�], which is bounded and independent of I. 
Therefore, as I--+ +oo, li'8'fAI --+ 0, we have
Q.E.D. 
Prob{IJk s A}= 1- Ii: II;�> Al = 1.
Therefore, when the population is large, the probability that IJk S A approaches 1. The 
intuition behind this result is quite clear. Figure 4 shows the upper bound of a.11 possible density
functions of IJk. We can see that there are at most 100 people who can own 1 % or more of
the shares of sector k at the same time, which is negligible in a large population. Most people 
will own a very small percentage of the total shares, a percentage that approximates zero. 
If the shares are distributed evenly in the population, IJk is approximately the inverse of the
population, which is very small, 10-6, even if there are only one million people in the economy. 
If there are several large shareholders, their mere existence makes the shares/person in the rest
of the economy approach zero. And because the small number of large shareholders, they have 
measure zero in the whole distribution. So both scenarios lead to the same conclusion: the 
probability that Ilk s A approaches one in a large population.
So Proposition 3 shows that in a large population the minimal aggregate compensation,
T min, increases with an increase in the market power of sector k, °'k. Apart from this, we would 
also like to know how Tmin changes when the other .underlying characte1:istics shift, such as
the sale price of sector k, Sk, and the minimal percentage of consumers who are better off as a
result of the privatization policy, d. 
Proposition 4 Holding other things the same, the minimal compensation, Tmin, increases
with an increase in the sale price of s ector k, S k ,  and the threshold for the Bureaucrat to stay
in. oJfice; d. That is, 
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Proof of Proposition 4: 
Differentiating T with respect to Sk, we get %[. = ll ·if= Ok 2': 0. From this, we can infer
that 8Tmin > 0. ask -
The other result, 0�'';?" 2': 0, is obvious from the property of cumulative distribution func­
tions. Q .E.D. 
The first part of Proposition 4 tells us that the minimal aggregate compensation increases 
with an increase in the sale price of sector k. This is because the shareholders of sector k will 
get less net profit as a result of the sale price increase of sector k and need more compensation 
to keep them on the same or higher indifference curves. 
The second part of Proposition 4 is obvious from Figure 3. If the proportion of consumers 
required to be better off increases, the minimal aggregate compensation need to increase. 
4.3 The Bureaucrat's Optimal Behavior - Surplus Budget Maximizing Bu­
reaucrat 
We simplify the Bureaucrat's constrained maximization problem by introducing the concept of 
minimal aggregate compensation. He will 
k N 
max L Bj + L Tj1rj +[-Bk+ sk + Tk7rk] -IT min· j=l j=k+l 
Since the Bureaucrat maximizes surplus budget, his decision as to whether to privatize 
another sector at time t depends on whether the privatization of that sector would increase 
his surplus budget. If not, he might as well maintain the status quo. For the analysis of his
problem, we define his time t-1 surplus budget as
k N 
SB'-1 = °L,Bj + L Tj7rJ-1, 
j=l j=k+I 
and his time t surplus budget as (if he chooses to privatize another sector):
k N 
SB'=°L,Bj+ L Tj7rj+[-Bk+Sk+Tk7rk]-ITmin· 
j:::::l j=k+I 
We define the incremental budget between these two periods as 
N 
IE = SB(t) - SB(t - 1) = L Tj(7rj - 7rj-1) +[-Bk+ sk + Tk7rk] - IT min·j=k+l 
Therefore, he will privatize another sector k if and only if there exists a sector such that I B 2': 0.
When I B 2 0 is satisfied, the Bureaucrat will choose the public sector that gives him the
highest surplus budget. We define the maximal budget at time t as 
k N 
SB*=°L,Bj+ L Tj7rj+[-Bk+Sk+Tk7rk]-ITmin·
j=I j=k+I 
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We can see that maximizing SB* is equivalent to maximizing IB. We would like to know the 
characteristics of sector k that give the Bureaucrat his maximal surplus budget. That is, what 
kind of sector would he like to choose? 
Proposition 5 For a Bureaucrat whose objective function is maximizing the surplus budget
subject to the constraint of staying in office, in a large population, his maximal budget increases 
with a decrease in the market power of sector k; the incremental budget increases with an 
increase in the amount of subsidy sector k receives from the government, i.e., 
8SB* 8IB 
-- = - < 0 if Prob{lh::; A}= 1;8 ok 8 ok - ' 8IB and 8Bk = - 1 . 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
Differentiating SB* and I B with respect to Pk, we get
8 SB* 
8P£ 
BIB 
8P£ 
N 8 t 8 t 8T ""' 'lrJ 'Irk mm L..J 71 8P' + Tk 8P' - I 8P' j=k+l k k k 
[1 ( � a7rj 07rk) 8Tmin ] = I I L..J Tj 8P' + Tk 8P' - 8P' . j=k+I k k k 
When I-+ +oo, we have J ( Lf=k+I Tj� + Tk�) -+ O; also, from Proposition 3, it follows 
that when I-+ +oo, \Ve have Prob{Bk � A} = 1, and thus 8�pin � 0. Therefore, it followsk 
th t asB• am < 0a apt = apt _ · k k 
To express the result in terms of the market power index, we have a3sB• = �IB < 0. Olk VCXk 
Now we differentiate IB with respect to Bk, and easily get �¥: = -1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 is our main result. It tells us that in a large population, the Bureaucrat who 
maximizes surplus budget will gain most by privatizing the public sector with the least market 
power and the most subsidy first, if all other characteristics of the public sectors are the same. 
Now let us turn to the influence of the characteristics of political institutions on the Bu­
reaucrat's behavior. We get the following proposition: 
Proposition 6 The maximal surplus budget increases with a decrease in the threshold of
the satisfaction level, d, i.e., 8�f < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6: 
Differentiating SB* with respect to d, and apply Proposition 4, we get the result. Q.E.D.
This proposition shows that in an economy with a smaller d, i.e., a less democratic society, 
the Bureaucrat actually benefits more from the privatization process. If the surplus budget
becomes his personal property, he becomes richer consequently. If it_ is used to ease the operation 
of the Bureaucracy or privatization process, it could be relatively easier and faster to privatize 
in a less democratic society. 
4.4 The Bureaucrat's Optimal Behavior - Popularity/Consumer Welfare 
Maximizing Bureaucrat 
As a comparison to the surplus budget max1m1zmg Bureaucrat, we sketch a popularity or 
consumer welfare maximizing Bureaucrat. vVe give him the objective function of maximizing 
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the number of consumers better off by privatization, subject to the constraint of a balanced 
budget, i.e., 
maxli: T � Til
k N 
s.t. L Bj + L Tjirj +[-Bk+ sk + TkirkJ = IT. 
j=l j=k+l 
Note that the constraint gives us the maximal compensation to the consumers, Tmax, which
is the average of the total budget over the whole population. From the maximand, we can 
see that the higher T max is, the larger the number of consumers better off by the privatization
policy. Therefore, the consumer welfare or popularity maximizing problem can be turned into 
a budget maximizing problem as follows, 
k N 
max L Bj + L Tjirj +[-Bk+ sk + Tk1rk]· 
j=l j=k+l 
We denote the maximal budget from the above mazimization problem by B*, 
k N 
B* = L Bj + L rjirj +[-Bk+ sk + rkirtJ.j=l j=k+I 
In a similar way as the previous section, we define the incremental budget between t and t-1 by 
N 
IB = I: rj(irj - irj-1) +[-Bk+ sk + rkirtJ.
j=k+l 
We would like to know the characteristics of sector k that gives the Bureaucrat the maximal 
budget. In other words, what kind of sector is he more likely to pick to maximize his objective 
function? 
Proposition 7 For a Bureaucrat who maximizes popularity/consumer welfare/budget, his
maximal budget increases with a decrease in the market power of sector k when there is a big 
enough private sector. I.e. ,  
f a�: < 0 z apt
_ 
, or 
k 
!5 0 z apt > ,k 
N .5 5_. and Lj=k+l rJ BP' � -rk BP'' k k 
while his incremental budget increases with an increase in subsidy sector k receives when it 
belongs to the public sect.or .. 1.e., ��� ·"' -1. 
Proof of Proposition 7: 
Differentiating B* and I B with respect to Pk, we get
We know that the first term is negative and the second term is ambiguous. 
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( ) f !'.'.'.i BB' _ 8IB · BB' _ BIB 1 I BP' $ 0, we get BP' - BP' $ 0. Eqmvalently, aa, - aa, $ 0.k k k 
(2) If ;;� > 0, then if the private sector is big enough so the decrease in tax revenue from
k 
all the private sectors outweighs the increase in tax revenue from the newly privatized sector, 
· "N .� > !'.'.'.i h 1 h ' (1) i.e., LJj=k+l TJ apt _ -Tk apt ,  we get t e same resu t as t at 1n case .k k 
Similarly, differentiating I B with respect to Bk, we get
8IB 
8Bk = -
1
.
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 7 shows that holding the other characteristics of the firms in the public sector 
the same, a Bureaucrat who maximizes popularity/ consumer welfare/budget will privatize the 
public sector with the most subsidy first; and if the private sector is big enough, he will privatize 
the sector with the lea.st market power first. 
5 Summary and Extensions
From the analysis of the strategies of Bureaucrats with different objective functions, we can 
see that the comparative statics results are very similar under ordinary situations. Among the 
public sectors with all other characteristics the same, each will choose to privatize the sector 
with the least market power and the most subsidy from the state. Intuitively speaking, this is 
the "cheapest" way to privatize from the Bureaucrat's point of view. 
This is a two-period static model. \'Ve assumed that the number of firms remained the 
same. If we add entry into the model, we can see that entry drives down the market power 
of any sector, a; = £1 · [_.L + L:h-'-J _!_] . Encouragement of entry will increase the number of
1 e11  -r- e1h 
firms in a sector and thus drive down °'j · Therefore, from the Bureaucrat's point of view, he
should encourage measures that can drive down the market power of a sector, such as entry 
and demonopolization. 
If we go back to the sequencing policy discussed in the introduction, we can see that the size 
of a sector is not the only factor that should be taken into consideration in the Bureaucrat's 
optimal policy. Other important factors, such as the subsidy a sector gets, the elasticity of 
demand of the product, and the competitiveness of a sector (the latter two are included in the
concept of the market power index) should a.II be taken into consideration.
In our model, we assume that all goods are non-substitutes to each other. We consider 
substitutes to be in the same sector. A more realistic way would be to solve the problem 
without this assumption. It would be more complicated and we are not sure how the result
would change. ·The ·wage·im::ome ·of-the ·consumers ·and .. 'tlte .. cost·functions ·oHirms are taken as
exogenously given. Also the mechanism for the sale of firms is not considered. Future work 
should be done to make these factors endogenous within the economy, so as to make the whole 
economy a closed system. Some crude thinking suggests that the privatization of a sector in the 
economy would lead to a total change in the supply and demand of labor. This will form the 
bases for the change in wage income. Therefore, for the consumers in a. transition economy, the 
compensation from the government and the change in their wage income will be the decisive 
factor in coping with price increases. 
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Appendix 
We assume that Eij = -%J1;!i- � O ,\li oft j ,  i , j  = 1 , 2, . . .  N. This assumption implies that
the consumer's utility functions need to satisfy the following condition: a;q�a(� ::; O . 
Proof 
Let the consumer solve the following maximization problem: 
max{q},mu(i() + m 
s.t.P · ij + m = y.
This is equivalent to the unconstrained maximization problem: 
max{q}u(i() + y - P · ij. 
Differentiating the maximand with respect to qi, we get the first order condition:
&u(i() 
- R 
&qi - ,
.
Differentiating the first order condition with respect to P; , where i oft j,  we get 
Since Eij ::; 0,  \Ii oft j ,  the righthand side of the above expression is greater or equal to zero, also
%J1. , we get the neccessary condition of Assumption 4:
J 
Q.E.D. 
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